Faces of irrationality in Euripides: on Medea's Irrationality by Nascimento, Daniel Simão
O que nos faz pensar, Rio de Janeiro, v.27, n.43, p. 237-272, jul.-dez. 2018
D
an
ie
l S
im
ão
 N
as
ci
m
en
to
*
D
O
I: 
ht
tp
://
do
i.o
rg
/1
0.
32
33
4/
oq
nf
p.
20
18
n4
3a
60
3
Recebido em: 02/03/2018. Aceito em: 31/08/2018.
Faces of irrationality in Euripides: 
on Medea’s irrationality
Faces da irracionalidade em Eurípides: 
sobre a irracionalidade de Medeia
Abstract
In Nascimento (2015) I criticized the thesis defended in Irwin (1983) according to 
which two of the most famous characters in Euripides’ plays, Phaedra and Medea, 
could be said to exemplify akratic behavior and, in the case of Phaedra, even to 
explain it. In that article, I’ve pointed out several weakness in these thesis in order 
to justify my disagreement. I also suggested that, although there was no reason 
why we should stop looking for examples and explanations of akratic behavior in 
Euripides’ plays, that should not be the only kind of irrational behavior we ought to 
be interested in finding there. In this paper, I argue that Medea actually instantiates 
a form of irrational behavior that is different from akratic behavior. The argument 
that follows is divided in four parts. After a brief introduction (section I), I clarify 
what sort of irrationality I believe to be instantiated by Medea’s behavior using 
Michael Bratman’s theory of plan stability (section II). Then, I analyze Euripides’ 
text in order to show why I think we should say that Medea does display that 
kind of irrationality (section III). The paper concludes with a brief summary of the 
argument (section IV).
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Resumo
Em Nascimento (2015), critiquei a tese defendida em Irwin (1983) segundo a 
qual dois dos mais famosos personagens das peças de Eurípides, Phaedra e Medea, 
poderiam ser citados como exemplos de comportamento acrático e, no caso de 
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Phaedra, até mesmo para explique. Nesse artigo, apontei várias fraquezas nessas 
teses para justificar minha discordância. Também sugeri que, embora não houvesse 
motivo para deixar de procurar exemplos e explicações do comportamento acrático 
nas peças de Eurípides, esse não deveria ser o único tipo de comportamento irracional 
que deveríamos estar interessados em encontrar ali. Neste artigo, argumento que 
Medea na verdade instancia uma forma de comportamento irracional diferente 
do comportamento acrático. O argumento que segue é dividido em quatro partes. 
Depois de uma breve introdução (seção I), clarifico que tipo de irracionalidade eu 
acredito ser instanciada pelo comportamento de Medea usando a teoria do plano de 
estabilidade de Michael Bratman (seção II). Então, eu analiso o texto de Eurípides 
para mostrar por que eu acho que devemos dizer que Medéia mostra esse tipo de 
irracionalidade (seção III). O artigo conclui com um breve resumo do argumento 
(seção IV).
Palavras-chave: Euripides, Medea, Irracionalidade, Bratman, Intenção.
I. Introduction
Euripides has been one of the most studied classical authors, and ever since 
antiquity the style and content of his plays have been the subject of much 
controversy1. In recent years, we’ve seen the appearance of a wealth of pub-
lications about Euripides’ works which have only increased the diversity of 
interpretations that are available to those who are still interested in his works 
today2. In such a scenario, it would be imprudent – not to say reckless – to 
even suggest that there is such a thing as a dominant approach, let alone a 
dominant interpretation, of Euripides’ works. As has been noted in (McClure 
2017, 3-4), in the last fifty years alone one can see the appearance of at least 
three hermeneutical approaches to the works of Euripides. 
1  Good introductions to the reception of Euripides’ works can be found in (Michelini 1987, 
3–51) and, more recently, in (Mastronarde 2010, 1–28). For a comprehensive account of the 
reception of all Euripides’ extant plays over the centuries see (Lauriola and Demetriou 2015).
2  These publications include not only the fifth volume of Tragicorum Graecorum Fragmenta (Kan-
nicht 2004), which contains an updated and expanded version of the complete fragments of the 
poet, but also several commentaries on the plays and fragments whose aim is to introduce the 
poet’s work to a new generation of students – see f. ex.  (Mastronarde 2002), (Mossman 2003), 
(Mastronarde 2004), (Diggle 2004), (Parker 2007), (Allan 2010), (Mastronarde 2010), (Mossman 
2011), (Liapis 2012), (Stuttard 2014) and (McClure 2017). 
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Informed by structuralist and semiotic theories, several recent studies 
have tried to find, examine and explore symbolic meanings and systems with-
in the plays3. Other new approaches have focused their attention in questions 
of politics, gender, and sexuality, and the construction of personal and social 
identity4. Last but not least, deconstructionist readings have tried to show 
how Euripides’ plays not only raise a lot more questions than they answer, 
but also exhibit an openness of form, structure, and meaning that compels 
the spectator – and therefore the reader – to determine their own perspec-
tives on the play’s characters and actions5. 
But before any of these new hermeneutical approaches gained the force 
and presence they have today, there was an older and equally venerable 
tradition that saw Euripides as a poet whose main object was the struggle 
between reason and emotion, the rational and the irrational, and even be-
tween the emotions themselves, inside the human soul. Among the many 
works that have contributed to establish this tradition, some of the most im-
portant were Eric Dodd’s article “Euripides the Irrationalist” (1929)6; Werner 
Jaeger’s Höhe und Krisis des attischen Geistes (1944) – the second volume of 
his Paideia: Die Formung des griechischen Menschen7; Bruno Snell’s Entdeckung 
des Geistes: Studien zur Entstehung des europäischen Denkens bei den Griechen 
(1946)8; Helen North’s Sophrosyne, self-knowledge and self-restraint in Greek 
3  F. ex. (Segal 1986).
4  F. ex. (Blondell et al. 1999), (Mendelsohn 2007), (Chong-Gossard 2008), (Powell 2012) and 
(Wohl 2015).
5  F. ex. (Meltzer 2006).
6  “For Euripides the evil in human nature is thus indestructible and rooted in heredity (which 
with him, as with Ibsen, takes the place of the Aeschylean Ancestral Curse); the intellect is power-
less to control it, though early education may have some effect in favourable cases. Euripides’ 
characters do not merely enunciate these principles; they also illustrate them in action. The Me-
dea, the Hippolytus, the Hecuba, the Heracles: what gives to all these plays their profoundly tragic 
character is the victory of irrational impulse over reason in a noble but unstable human being. 
(…) Hence the scientific care which, as an ancient critic remarks, he devoted to the study of erotas 
te kai manías--the dark irrational side of man’s nature” (Dodds 1929, 99).
7  “Euripides is the first psychologist. He is the discoverer of the soul in a  new sense of the word, 
the revealer of the restless and moving world of the emotions and passions of men. He never tires 
of showing how they are expressed and hoe they conflict with the intellectual forces of the soul. 
He is the creator of the pathology of the mind”. (Jaeger 1944, 413).
8  “The people of Aeschylus are not altogether dependent on the gods, but are to a degree respon-
sible for their own actions. Euripides goes further and locates his arena of conflicts in the human 
heart alone. Men like Aristophanes may lament that a beautiful world has thus collapsed, but 
for most of the Greeks this profanation of myth was not a sacrilegious act; faith in the Christian 
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literature (1966)9; Terence Irwin’s article “Euripides and Socrates” (1983); 
and Jacqueline de Romilly’s Patience mon cœur, l’essor de la psychologie dans la 
littérature grecque classique (1984)10. 
The present work can and should be understood within this last hermeu-
tical tradition. In a very important sense, it is a continuation of a previous 
work – namely (Nascimento 2015) – in which I criticized the thesis defended 
in (Irwin 1983) according to which two of the most famous characters in 
Euripides’ plays, Phaedra and Medea, could be said to exemplify akratic be-
havior and, in the case of Phaedra, even to explain it. In (Nascimento 2015), 
I’ve pointed out several weakness in these thesis in order to justify my dis-
agreement and suggested that, although there was no reason why we should 
stop looking for examples and explanations of akratic behavior in Euripides’ 
plays, that should not be the only kind of irrational behavior we ought to be 
interested in finding there. 
As I’ve remarked on that opportunity, it is surprising to find that, despite 
the fact that the authors in the last hermeneutical tradition mentioned above 
are still widely known, there is no in-depth study of the different forms of 
sense was unknown to them, especially in matters of the Homeric religion which by and large 
controlled the great works of literature. The Greek myth was not destroyed by the opposition of 
nonbelievers, or the fanaticism of heretics; it underwent a logical transformation in accordance 
with its own laws. The divine gave way to what was considered more natural--or should we say, 
in the spirit of this religion, to what was considered more divine? Men gradually succeeded in de-
priving the gods of their power over the natural world and claiming it for themselves, for they had 
discovered that the human mind was itself divine. Theirs were gods who had long ceased to work 
with miracles, which demand faith because they shock human reason. Though Aristophanes 
pictures Euripides as indulging in wickedness with his natural, his all too natural interpretation 
of the characters of myth, Euripides for his part aspires to serve a moral interest with his exposés. 
The objective of the Hippolytus is by no means merely an analysis of the passion of love as such, 
but a scrutiny of the moral conflict of Phaedra which is no different from that of Medea. The call 
of morality is voiced against blind impulse, and once more the ethical reactions, scruples and 
inhibitions and a bad conscience, come into play” (Snell 1946, 122).
9  “To Euripides, who saw in the triumph of the irrational over the rational the primary source 
of tragedy for the individual and society, sophrosyne is one of several names for the rational 
element. It is that quality, intellectual in origin, but predominantly moral in its application and 
effect, which controls and moderate the passions, whether lust, anger, ambition, cruelty, or even 
something so trivial as gluttony or drunkenness. Euripides has been called the first psychologist 
, and very likely it was his keen interest in probing the motives to action and exposing the death 
struggle between passion and reason in the human soul that led him to set so high a value on 
sophrosyne, which is called in the Medea the fairest gifts of the gods (636) and in Fragment 959 
the most venerable of all virtues, since it dwells for ever with the good” (North 1966, 69).
10  “(…) Euripides not only has discovered the contradictions of the heart and the incoherence 
of passion, which his predecessors ignored: he has at once elevated them to such a degree that 
neither the commentators nor the imitators, not even the modern ones, have managed to follow 
him” (Romilly, 1984, 101).
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irrationality that are actually depicted in Euripides’ plays. Although one could 
not possibly pretend to fill this gap in one article, I do intend to provide here 
a modest contribution to such a study by arguing that Medea actually instan-
tiates a form of irrational behavior that is different from akratic behavior. 
The argument that follows is divided in three parts. In section II, I clarify 
what sort of irrationality I believe to be instantiated by Medea’s behavior 
using Michael Bratman’s theory of plan stability. In section III, I analyze 
Euripides’ text in order to show why I think we should say that Medea does 
display that sort of irrationality. In section IV, I conclude with a brief sum-
mary of the argument.
II. Michael Bratman on plan stability, temptation and irrationality
According to Bratman, one of the distinguishing characteristics of human be-
ings is that they are, or are at least are capable of being, “planning creatures” – 
creatures that settle in advance on more or less complex plans concerning the 
future, which will then guide their later conduct (Bratman 1983, 271). We 
may do this either to avoid the need for deliberation at the time of action or 
in order to coordinate various activities that we have to perform. Either way, 
says Bratman, the ability to have such plans is a kind of ‘‘universal means’’, 
useful in our pursuit of a wide variety of different ends (Id., 275). In order to 
be able to serve us for this function, our plans have to satisfy three main con-
ditions: they must function as conduct-controlling pro-attitudes, and they 
must possess both means-end coherence and stability. 
But what exactly is a “conduct-controlling pro-attitude”? In his writings, 
Bratman argues that plans tend to motivate us to act as planned, which means 
that they are “pro-attitudes” in at least a very general sense in which desires, 
inclinations, goals, and valuations are pro-attitudes. But he also argues that we 
need to distinguish between two kinds of pro-attitudes: conduct-influencing 
pro-attitudes, such as desires, and conduct-controlling pro-attitudes, such as 
plans. In (Bratman 1983), the author formulates this difference as follows:
Suppose I desire a milk-shake for lunch, recognize that the occasion is here, 
and am guilty of no irrationality. Still, I might not drink a milkshake; for 
my desire for a milkshake still needs to be weighed against conflicting de-
sires—say, my desire to lose weight. (…) Now, the motivational role of 
plans seems different; plans seem not to be merely conduct-influencers. 
Suppose that this morning I settled on a plan that included my having a 
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milkshake at lunch. Lunch-time arrives, my plan remains, and nothing 
unexpected happens. In such a case I do not need yet again to tote up the 
pros and cons concerning milkshake drinking. Rather, in the normal course 
of events I will simply proceed to execute this part of my plan and order a 
milkshake. My plan will not merely influence my conduct, it will control it: 
it is a conduct-controlling pro-attitude. (Bratman 1983, 273).
Bratman’s point in the above mentioned passage seems to be clear enough. 
Conduct-influencing pro-attitudes are those attitudes which provide us with 
motivations for acting in a certain way but do not settle in advance how it is 
that we should act in a given context, while conduct-controlling pro-attitudes 
are attitudes that not only motivate us to act in a certain way, but also do away 
with the need for further deliberation in some situations precisely because 
they settle in which way we are to act in these situations.
In what concerns constraints of means end-coherence, Bratman argues 
that our plans typically involve both a hierarchical and a linear structure, 
which means that general plans will typically embed more specific plans, or 
sub-plans, that these sub-plans should display the level of detail we believe 
to be required for us to fulfill our general plans11 and, finally, that they should 
also be consistent both with the plan within which they are embedded and 
with our other plans (Id., 276-278).
Last but not least, stability is the factor that allows our plans to survive 
in time. According to Bratman (Id., 271), when we settle on a plan we create 
a new psychological state – the “state of having a plan” – and this state pos-
sesses a certain stability. In the normal course of events, says Bratman, this 
state will not vary in response to ordinary, non-rational bodily processes, un-
like my desires to eat and drink, and, although any plan may be reconsidered, 
having plan involves a strong disposition not to reconsider it except in the 
face of a significant problem (Id., 274). 
11  It is important to notice that Bratman recognizes that our plans have a sort of incompleteness 
about themselves, and that the demand for means-end coherence is both connected with and 
limited by this characteristic of plans (Bratman 1983, 275-276). Our plans do not specify what to 
do in every conceivable circumstance, they don’t normally specify what to do down to the most 
detailed, physical level and, when initially formulated, they may only provide a relatively general 
specification of some later conduct, a specification the agent knows will need to be filled in prior 
to the time of action. The demand for means-end coherence is not a demand to complete my 
plans with respect to every conceivable circumstance and detail. It is only a demand to fill in my 
plans with enough specifications so that I can successfully execute them.
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As the author is well aware, once he uses an associated disposition not to 
reconsider a plan as a means to define stability he is setting a challenge for 
himself, namely, to determine what are the conditions in which it is reasonable 
for us to reconsider, and even discard, our plans. Indeed, it does seem obvious 
that even though we do not want, as limited rational agents, to be constantly 
reflecting on whether to reconsider our plans, we want to be able to say that 
when the time and circumstance for putting our plans in action arrive we will 
abandon our plans in favor of some alternative course of action if that is the 
rational thing to do. The problem, of course, is to determine just when it is 
rational to abandon our plans in favor of some alternative course of action. 
Although Bratman mentions and treats the question of the reasonable sta-
bility of plans in several of his more recent writings, the nucleus of his theory 
of reasonable plan stability can already be found in (Bratman 1992, 1996 and 
1998). In these writings, he develops his theory through discussions and ana-
lyzes of several problematic cases which raise different questions for a theory 
of reasonable planning. For the sake of clarity, brevity and objectivity, I’ll only 
deal with two of these questions, namely, what are the changes of belief that 
warrant reconsideration, and eventual abandonment, of our plans, and when 
can we say that it is reasonable to abandon our plans when we are faced with 
what Bratman calls “temptation”. 
In (Bratman 1992, 4-5), the author proposes that we consider the follow-
ing case in order to determine just what are the changes in beliefs that would 
warrant reconsideration and eventual abandonment of our plans. Suppose 
(1) at t1 an agent forms the intention to A at t2 on the basis of his relevant 
desire-belief reasons for and against A at t2 and for and against its relevant 
and admissible alternatives; (2) at t1 this same agent sees the desire-belief 
reasons he has in favor of his A-ing as superior to those he has in favor of the 
relevant alternatives to A-ing at t2 as superior to those he has in favor of the 
relevant alternatives to A-ing; but (3) when t2 arrives there is no change in 
his desires, but there are differences between what he expected at t1 to be the 
case at t2 and what he now, at t2, believes to be the circumstances. 
As the author remarks, it seems clear that some kinds of divergence between 
his earlier and later beliefs about his circumstances at t2 will straightway oblige 
him to reconsider and even abandon his plan – for example, he cannot rationally 
intend to A at t2 and also believe that the circumstances at t2 make it impossible 
for him to A. On the other hand, some kinds of divergence between earlier and 
later beliefs will normally have no tendency at all to trigger even reconsideration, 
let alone the abandonment of a plan – for example, if he discovers yet another 
reason for A-ing, or yet another reason against one of A’s alternatives. 
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In contrast to both cases, some changes in belief may not oblige him to 
abandon his plan but might require him to reconsider it. For example, if an 
agent has decided to go to the theater instead of going to a piano concert but 
eventually discovers that the tickets for the theater are more expensive than 
he had earlier anticipated, or that there is also a string quartet concert that he 
could attend instead. In the first case his cognitive change somewhat weak-
ens his desire-belief reasons for going to the theater, in the second case his 
cognitive change introduces a new and attractive alternative not previously 
considered. Such cognitive changes do potentially threaten his earlier plan 
even though they may not be enough for him to even reconsider it, let alone 
to straightaway abandon it. In (Bratman 1992, 7-8), the author calls such 
changes prima facie triggers of reconsideration. 
Although we do not need to outline in detail the way Bratman conceives 
such prima facie triggers of reconsideration, there are two aspects of his theory 
that are worth emphasizing. The first is that, according to him, even when 
such changes occur it might not be worth to the agent to reconsider his initial plans. 
This is because, as (Bratman 1992, 6-7) notices, reconsidering a plan is an 
activity that has costs: it uses up time and other limited resources, and while 
engaged in reconsideration an agent might be unable to do other valuable 
things. This is why Bratman proposes that when thinking about whether 
or not to even reconsider a plan we need to first ask ourselves if a change 
of plans would bring enough benefits to outweigh the costs of the recon-
sideration itself. If the answer is “yes” and the agent has no special reason 
to distrust his own judgment, then reconsideration of our plans, given his 
change in beliefs, is recommended (Bratman 1992, 9-10). The second is 
that even if such a change warrants reconsideration, says Bratman, it might still 
not be worth it for the agent to change his plan if the costs of abandoning it are 
greater than the benefits yielded by the alternative course of action that he 
is now considering.
In (Bratman 1998, 60) the author builds on this theory when he argues 
that planning agents have a background of beliefs, values, desires, cares and 
concerns which support considered evaluative rankings of various kinds of 
alternatives in light of relevant beliefs; that these rankings are expected to 
shape his choices of which plans to adopt; and that in order for the reconsid-
eration and eventual abandonment of a plan to be rational it must be ground-
ed in a change in one or more elements that constitute the background which 
grounds the plan, even though not every change in one of these background 
elements justifies the reconsideration and eventual abandonment of a plan.
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So much for Bratman’s theory about the reasonability of reconsidering our 
plans in the face of changing beliefs. It is time to move to the second question I 
proposed to treat here, namely, when, according to Bratman, it is reasonable to 
abandon our plans in the face of temptation. In order to answer this question, 
we must first understand what exactly is Bratman calling temptation.
In (Bratman 1996), the problem of temptation is introduced with the fol-
lowing example:
Suppose I am a pianist who plays nightly at a club. Each night before my 
performance, I eat dinner with a friend, one who fancies good wines. Each 
night my friend offers me a fine wine with dinner, and as I also love good 
wine each night I am tempted to drink it. But I know that when I drink 
alcohol, my piano playing afterward suffers. And when I reflect in a calm 
moment, it is clear to me that superior piano playing in my evening per-
formance is more important to me than the pleasures of wine with dinner. 
Indeed, each morning I reflect on the coming challenges of the day and have 
a clear preference for my turning down the wine. Yet early each evening 
when I am at dinner with my friend, I find myself inclined in the direction 
of the wine. If I were to go ahead and drink the wine, mine would be a case 
of giving into temptation. (Bratman 1996, 294-295).
The first thing we must notice about this example is that Bratman does not 
think that succumbing to temptation is the same thing as losing control of 
one’s action12. That being said, it still remains unclear just how he conceives 
what is going on in the above mentioned example. In order for us to under-
stand that, we should bear in mind the way he uses the concept of temporal 
discounting to explain his example:
12  “Austin once warned us not to “collapse succumbing to temptation into losing control of our-
selves” (1961, 146). Ainslie would agree. On his view, when I give into temptation, I do not lose 
control of my action. I control my action in accordance with my preference at the time of action; 
but this preference is itself at odds with central preferences of mine at different times. I proceed 
to sketch this story”. (Bratman 1996, 295). In this, and many other aspects, Bratman’s theory is 
heavily indebted to the works of George Ainslie. Although Ainslie’s only work cited in (Bratman 
1996) is (Ainslie 1992), interested readers would do well to consult (Ainslie 1975, 1987, 1989 
and 1991), as well as (Ainslie and Herrnstein 1981), for a better grasp of the scientific bases that 
underlie (Ainslie 1992), and (Ainslie 2003, 2012, 2013a, 2013b, and 2017), as well as (Ainslie 
and Monterosso 2003), to see how the author has developed his theory in the last 25 years.
246 Daniel Simão Nascimento
O que nos faz pensar, Rio de Janeiro, v.27, n.43, p. 237-272, jul.-dez. 2018
Begin with the idea that we frequently discount goods simply because they 
are in the future. Think of the utility of a certain good to me at a certain 
time as a measure of my preference for that good as compared with com-
petitors. In temporal discounting, the utility to me today of a good that I 
would certainly get tomorrow is less than the utility it would have for me 
tomorrow, and this difference in utility is due solely to the temporal differ-
ence. Bill, for example, prefers cake now to ice cream now, yet he prefers 
ice cream now to cake tomorrow. If this shift in preference is not due to 
uncertainty about getting the cake tomorrow if he so chose, but is rather 
due solely to the different times at which Bill would get the desserts, then 
Bill’s case is one of temporal discounting. For such cases we can speak of 
the discount rate - the rate at which the utility of the future good is dimin-
ished solely by the perception that the good lies in the future. Perhaps such 
temporal discounting is irrational. Still, many (…) suppose it is pervasive. 
If so, we can expect certain cases of giving into temptation. If, for example, 
my discount rate is steep enough, the utility to me at dinner of my playing 
well that evening will be substantially reduced from its utility to me later 
that evening. The utility to me at dinner of drinking wine may then be 
above the utility to me at dinnertime of playing well later. If my action at 
dinner is determined by such preferences, I will drink the wine. (Bratman 
1996, 295).
As Bratman notices shortly after, if we apply this theory to the case of 
the pianist in a straightforward manner we will not yet be able to explain 
why earlier in the day he had a clear preference not for the wine, but for the 
superior performance, since the performance was further distanced in time 
than the wine. Nevertheless, Bratman argues that we can account for the 
preference reversals displayed by the pianist if we allow that certain discount 
functions are not linear or exponential but, rather, sufficiently bowed so that 
the utility curves cross prior to the earlier event (Bratman 1996, 296). 
As the author explains, if we suppose that the pianist’s discount rate con-
cerning wine is the same as that concerning piano playing, and suppose that 
his evaluations of both goods are subject to highly bowed discount functions, 
then we can expect the following: from temporally far away, he will prefer 
superior piano playing to wine at dinner, but at some time before dinner the 
utility curves will cross, and there will be a reversal of preference. This re-
versal, however, is temporary. At some time after dinner, he will again prefer 
superior piano playing to the wine and, if he has already drunk the wine, he 
will then regret it.
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As it must be clear by now, the problem posed by cases of temptation as 
conceived by Bratman is the problem of how a rational agent should deal 
with the kind of situation that is created by such highly bowed discount func-
tions. As (Bratman 1998, 70) remarks, the standard answer to this question 
is that he should take into account both the present and the future conse-
quences of his actions, give equal weight to both types of consequences when 
they’re equally certain, and then choose the course of action that offers the 
best overall consequences. Bratman himself endorses this opinion when he 
proposes that we should stick to our plans in occasions of temptation when 
(a) if we stick with our plans we will be glad we did and (b) if we do not stick 
with our plans we will end up wishing we had stuck with it, i.e. we will end 
up regretting not having stuck with our plans. Whenever (a) and (b) are true, 
says Bratman, following through with one’s plans satisfies the no-regret condi-
tion and, therefore, it is what the agent should do in order to act rationally.  
Although this solution might still appear elegant and powerful to some, the 
fact is that it is open to one important objection. In his early articles Bratman, 
relied heavily on the rationality of non-reconsideration of previously made 
plans. According to the theory delineated there, in order to act rationally when 
under temptation an agent had to anticipate the future regret he would experi-
ence if he abandoned his plans in order to avoid even reconsidering them. But 
why must an agent who is under temptation have such fear of reconsideration? 
As remarked in (Bratman 2014, 299), although we could say that some-
times the cost of reconsideration will make it better not to reconsider, we 
must also recognize that sometimes reconsideration in face of temptation im-
plies no such costs. Therefore, we must concede that at least in some cases we 
have no good reason not to reconsider our previously made plans in face of 
temptation, even though we may, in the end, stick with our previously made 
plans. This raises a problem for the theory in Bratman’s earlier articles be-
cause it is not clear how exactly can that theory make it rational for an agent 
to stick with his plan when he does reconsider it in the face of temptation. 
Indeed, according to Bratman himself temptation is not just a motivational 
push in a given direction: it implies a change in judgement as to what is better 
in light of the considerations that matter to a given agent in a given occasion 
(Bratman 2014, 297-298). This means that a case of temptation is a case where 
the agent actually believes, at the moment he is being tempted, that it is best 
to give in to temptation. Therefore, if the agent does reconsider his plans when 
under temptation he’ll do so under the impression that his best course of ac-
tion is to give in to temptation and, if that is so, it is hard to see how can it be 
rational for such an agent to choose not to give in to temptation. 
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It seems that, to answer this question in the affirmative, a supporter of 
Bratman’s early theory would have to claim that when under temptation the 
agent should take into account only his future preferences, and not his pres-
ent preferences. Although this is a possible answer, Bratman himself came 
to be dissatisfied with it because it violated what he called the principle of the 
rational priority of present evaluation (Bratman 2014, 297). According to this 
principle, if at any given time the agent does indeed have a relevant judgment 
concerning which alternative would be strictly best, then, if that agent is 
functioning rationally, she will opt for that alternative. Once we’ve accepted 
such a principle, it follows that the theory delineated by Bratman in his ear-
lier articles gives us is an overly weak view about the rational significance of 
our plans and, therefore, his early theory must be changed – as the author 
himself noted in (Bratman 2014, 299).
According to the new theory we find in (Bratman 2014), what happens 
when an agent rationally resists temptation is that the temptation leads an 
agent to shift his previous judgement in favor of a given option, and maybe 
even to reconsider his previous plan, but then the anticipation of future re-
gret shifts that judgement back in favor of his previously selected option (Id., 
308). In other words, when an agent resists temptation through anticipating 
future regret what he does is not to refrain from reconsideration, but to en-
gage in further reconsideration taking into account both the value judgment 
that is embedded in his policy about the desire he is considering whether or 
not to satisfy and his eventual future regret. Anticipated future regret, says 
Bratman, can change which action will seem best for the agent and, therefore, 
make an impact on his deliberation (Id., 304).
Having clarified how Bratman’s later theory of temptation deals with the 
objection formulated above, I’ll finish this section with a brief summary of 
this theory before moving on to Euripides’ text.
If what is said above is correct, we say that according to Bratman tempta-
tion is a phenomenon that occurs when the following conditions are met. At 
t
1
 the individual faces a choice between doing A or doing B at t
2
; the individ-
ual’s evaluation of A and B is subject to bowed temporal discount functions 
so that (a) at t
1
 he prefers to do A than to do B and, therefore, he chooses 
and plans to do A at t
2
. But, precisely because the individual’s evaluation of 
A and B is subject to bowed temporal discount functions, (b) the individual 
will come to temporally, but not definitively, prefer B to A before t
2
, and so he 
will be tempted to do B instead of doing A either before or at t
2
; so that (c) if 
he actually does B instead of A he will come to regret it latter, once his prefer-
ences are back the way they were at t
1
. 
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According to Bratman, an agent can deal with temptation rationally in 
either of two ways. If the case is such that what is to be gained by abandon-
ing his plans cannot possibly outweigh the cost of reconsidering his previous 
plan, then an agent will act rationally if he does not reconsider his plans. But 
in cases where reconsideration implies in no such costs an agent may recon-
sider his plan and still act rationally if he anticipates his future regret, takes 
it into consideration when reconsidering his plans, and decides to follow 
through with his plan.
I believe I’ve said enough about Bratman’s theory for our present purposes. It 
is now time to turn to Euripides’ Medea and show why I believe this theory can 
help us see the kind of irrationality that is displayed by Medea in Euripides’ play.
III. The irrationality of Euripides’ Medea
In order to properly understand the setting of Euripides’ play, it will be useful 
to remember the broad outlines of the history of Jason and Medea according 
to the Greek mythical tradition13. 
Jason was the son of Aeson, king of Iolcos. In some versions of his myth 
he had Alcimede, daughter of Phylacus, as his mother, but in other versions 
his mother is Polymede, daughter of Autolycus. The different versions also 
disagree as to how exactly Aeson ceased to be the king of Iolchos. Some say 
he was deposed by his half-brother Pelias, the son of Tyro and Poseidon, but 
others say that Aeson had entrusted power to Pelias until Jason came of age. 
Either way, all versions agree that Jason was brought up at mount Pelion by 
the Centaur Chiron, who taught him medicine, and that when he reached 
manhood Jason left mount Pelion and returned to Iolcos dressed in a tiger-
skin, carrying a lance in each hand and having no shoe on his left foot. 
Jason arrived in Iolcos just as his uncle Pelias was offering a sacrifice pre-
cisely because he became alarmed when an oracle had told him to ‘mistrust a 
man who had only one shoe’. After staying five days in the city, Jason called 
on Pelias and claimed the power which was his by right, i.e. the throne of 
Iolcos. In response, Pelias not only denied him the throne but also ordered 
Jason to bring him the golden fleece. 
At that time the golden fleece was in the possession of Aeetes, king of Colchis, 
and was known to be guarded there by a dragon. Pelias, of course, was certain that 
Jason would never succeed. Indeed, Jason himself was so certain he could not do 
13  The information contained in the next paragraphs were taken from (Grimal 1990, 229-230, 259-260).
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it alone that he sought the help of several other companions, which came to be 
known as ‘the Argonauts’. But even they would not have been enough for such a 
daunting task. For one of them, Argos, actually needed and had the help of Athena 
to build the very boat they would need for their voyage to Colchis, which was 
named “the Argo”, and in Colchis Jason would eventually meet yet another ally 
who would prove to be necessary for the completion of his mission, namely, Medea. 
Medea was the daughter of Aeetes, the granddaughter of Helios – the Sun, 
which the Greeks took to be a God – and the niece of Circe – a famous sor-
ceress who was also a daughter of Helios. According to some versions of the 
Myth Medea’s mother was Idyia, but according to others it was Hecate, who 
was also a goddess. All the versions of the myth of the Argonauts agree on the 
importance of the part played by Medea in their mission: without her, Jason 
would not have won the Golden Fleece. She gave him the ointment to protect 
him from the bulls of Hephaestus, and used her spells to send the dragon that 
guarded the golden fleece to sleep. Jason promised to marry her in return for 
her help. As soon as the fleece was gained Medea took flight with him and the 
Argonauts, never to return to Colchis.
After leaving Colchis, Jason and Medea went back to Iolchus in search of 
revenge against Pelias – who was still the king. Once more, Medea’s skills as 
a sorcerer proved invaluable in the attainment of their goal. After arriving in 
Iolchus, Medea persuaded the king’s daughters that she could rejuvenate any 
living being by cutting it up and boiling its pieces in a magic liquid. She even 
successfully demonstrated her skill using an old ram. Convinced by this, the 
daughters of Pelias cut him up and threw the pieces into a cauldron provided 
by Medea hoping that she would bring him back to life. Medea, however, 
never did so. After this ruse, Acastus – who was Pelias’ son and, consequently, 
heir to the throne – banished Jason and Medea from his kingdom.
After they were forced to leave Iolchus the couple made their way to 
Corinth, which was the native city of Aeetes. They lived there in peace for 
some time, until Creon – the king of Corinth – offered the hand of his daugh-
ter to Jason. Euripides’ play begins after Medea has learned that Jason has 
accepted the king’s offer. During the whole play she refers several times to his 
acceptance as a betrayal and a breaking of his oath of marriage to her, which 
is in line with the mythical tradition we know. Indeed, in this tradition all the 
subsequent crimes of Medea were explained by Jason’s infidelity to his oath14.
14  As we know, in archaic Greek law an oath between two parties sufficient to establish wed-
lock, but that ceased to be so in the classical epoch, and Euripides’ plays presents us with an 
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The play opens with a monologue spoken by the nurse of Medea’s children 
in which she laments the fact that Jason and the Argonauts sailed to Colchis 
in search for the Golden Fleece (1-48). Had that not happened, says the nurse, 
none of the current misfortunes being suffered by Medea would have happened, 
and she would not be so deep in grief. The nurse says she is afraid that Medea 
will hatch some sinister plan of revenge, and at the end she announces the arriv-
al of the children of Medea and Jason, who are oblivious to their mother’s plight. 
The children enter the scene accompanied by their tutor, with whom the 
nurse exchanges a few brief words. He says he heard that Creon has decided 
to exile Medea and her Children from Corinth (49-95). The Nurse is taken 
aback by the news, and even manifests her surprise to the children by asking 
them if they have heard what kind of man their father is towards them (82-
84). In the end, she reassures them that all will be well and orders them to 
go into their house (89). Immediately after, however, she also tells the Tutor 
to keep them as far away from their mother as possible because she has seen 
Medea look at them savagely, as if intending to do something to them (89-95).
It is only then that Medea appears (96). In the next segment, she shows all her 
grief over Jason’s actions, calls her children “accursed children of a hateful mother”, 
prays that they perish with their father and that his whole house collapses (111-
114, 160-167), expresses her intention to seek revenge and, finally, asks the Cho-
rus to keep this intention a secret (259-266). The Chorus Leader assures her they 
will do so (267-268), and then announces the arrival of Creon (269-270).
In the scene that follows (271-356), Creon tells Medea that he has heard of 
her threats against the royal house, and that he has indeed decided to exile her 
immediately. At first, Medea tries to convince Creon he is wrong about her de-
sires of revenge against the royal house, saying that the only one who has done 
wrong against her is Jason. But Creon is unconvinced by such words, and in the 
end he only agrees to give her one day to make her preparations to leave after 
Medea adopts the posture of suppliant and insistently supplicates him to do so. 
Before he leaves, Creon tells Medea in no uncertain words that she will be put 
to death if she is still inside the borders of Corinth after the next the sun rises.
After Creon’s exit, the Chorus Leader laments the misfortunes of Medea 
and wonders where can Medea go to find reprieve from her troubles after 
she leaves Corinth (357-363). But although in her answer to this lament 
Medea shows herself to be aware of the difficulty of her position, she also 
interesting fusion between archaic and classical legal perspectives on marriage. On this matter, 
see (Gombini 2018). 
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feels confident enough to say that she has secured what she needed to begin 
executing her plan for revenge. Since this is the first time in the play that she 
actually spells out her intentions, it is worth to quote it in full.  
The situation is bad in every way: who will deny it? But things are not at all 
as you describe them, do not imagine it: there are still struggles for the newly-
wedded pair, and for the maker of the match difficulties that are not trifling. 
Do you think I would ever have fawned on this man unless I stood to gain, 
unless I were plotting? I would not even have spoken to him or touched him 
with my hands. But he has reached such a pitch of folly that, while it lay in his 
power to check my plans by banishing me, he has permitted me to stay for this 
day, a day on which I shall make corpses of three of my enemies, the father, his 
daughter, and my husband. Now since I possess many ways of killing them, I 
do not know which I should try first, my friends: shall I set the bridal chamber 
on fire or thrust a sharp sword through their vitals, creeping into the house 
where the marriage bed is laid out? One thing, however, stands in my path: 
if I am caught entering the house and plotting its destruction, I will be killed 
and bring joy to my foes. Best to proceed by the direct route, in which I am the 
most skilled, and kill them with poison. So be it! Now let us suppose they have 
been killed. What city will receive me? What friend will give me a safe country 
and a secure house and rescue me? There is no one. And so I shall wait a short 
time yet, and if some citadel of rescue appears, I shall go about this murder by 
stealth. But if hard circumstance forces me into the open, I shall take the sword 
and, even though I am sure to die for it, kill them with my own hand, going to 
the very utmost of daring15. (Medea, 364-394)16.
15  κακῶς πέπρακται πανταχῇ: τίς ἀντερεῖ; (365) ἀλλ᾽ οὔτι ταύτῃ ταῦτα, μὴ δοκεῖτέ πω, <μέλλει 
τελευτᾶν εἴ τι τῇ τέχνῃ σθένω.> ἔτ᾽ εἴσ᾽ ἀγῶνες τοῖς νεωστὶ νυμφίοις καὶ τοῖσι κηδεύσασιν οὐ 
σμικροὶ πόνοι. δοκεῖς γὰρ ἄν με τόνδε θωπεῦσαί ποτε εἰ μή τι κερδαίνουσαν ἢ τεχνωμένην; 
(370) οὐδ᾽ ἂν προσεῖπον οὐδ᾽ ἂν ἡψάμην χεροῖν. ὁ δ᾽ἐς τοσοῦτον μωρίας ἀφίκετο, ὥστ᾽, ἐξὸν 
αὐτῷ τἄμ᾽ ἑλεῖν βουλεύματα γῆς ἐκβαλόντι, τήνδ᾽ ἐφῆκεν ἡμέραν μεῖναί μ᾽, ἐν ᾗ τρεῖς τῶν ἐμῶν 
ἐχθρῶν νεκροὺς (375) θήσω, πατέρα τε καὶ κόρην πόσιν τ᾽ ἐμόν. πολλὰς δ᾽ ἔχουσα θανασίμους 
αὐτοῖς ὁδούς, οὐκ οἶδ᾽ ὁποίᾳ πρῶτον ἐγχειρῶ, φίλαι: πότερον ὑφάψω δῶμα νυμφικὸν πυρί, (ἢ 
θηκτὸν ὤσω φάσγανον δι᾽ ἥπατος), (380) σιγῇ δόμους ἐσβᾶσ᾽, ἵν᾽ ἔστρωται λέχος; ἀλλ᾽ ἕν τί 
μοι πρόσαντες: εἰ ληφθήσομαι δόμους ὑπερβαίνουσα καὶ τεχνωμένη, θανοῦσα θήσω τοῖς ἐμοῖς 
ἐχθροῖς γέλων. κράτιστα τὴν εὐθεῖαν, ᾗ πεφύκαμεν (385) σοφοὶ μάλιστα, φαρμάκοις αὐτοὺς ἑλεῖν. 
εἶἑν: καὶ δὴ τεθνᾶσι: τίς με δέξεται πόλις; τίς γῆν ἄσυλον καὶ δόμους ἐχεγγύους ξένος παρασχὼν 
ῥύσεται τοὐμὸν δέμας; οὐκ ἔστι. μείνασ᾽ οὖν ἔτι σμικρὸν χρόνον, (390) ἢν μέν τις ἡμῖν πύργος 
ἀσφαλὴς φανῇ, δόλῳ μέτειμι τόνδε καὶ σιγῇ φόνον: ἢν δ᾽ ἐξελαύνῃ ξυμφορά μ᾽ ἀμήχανος, αὐτὴ 
ξίφος λαβοῦσα, κεἰ μέλλω θανεῖν, κτενῶ σφε, τόλμης δ᾽ εἶμι πρὸς τὸ καρτερόν.
16  Unless otherwise noted, all translations of Euripides’ text follow the one provided by David 
Kovacs in (Euripides 1994).
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As we can see, Medea’s plan shows just the kind of hierarchical structure 
highlighted by Bratman. At this point, Medea has already established the goal 
of her plan – namely, to kill Creon, his daughter and Jason – but she has not 
yet settled all its details. Medea’s doubts have nothing to do with the goal 
she set for herself. What she has not yet determined is what is the best route 
to achieve her goal. She is in doubt as to whether it is better to attempt the 
murder by stealth, using poison, or if it is better to go ‘to the very utmost of 
daring’ and sneak into their house in order to kill Creon, his daughter and 
Jason with a sword. The disadvantage of the second plan is that it is very risky, 
and this is why Medea decides not to try it unless she is forced to do so. We 
could say, then, that she has settled on a general plan, but has not yet chosen 
what are the subplans that will make up that general plan.
As fate – or perhaps Zeus – would have it, Medea actually does find some-
one with whom she can barter an assurance of safe haven way before her 
time expires17. After Medea has unveiled her general plans, we are treated to 
a short passage in which the Chorus speaks (410-445) and then Jason arrives 
on the scene to meet Medea. What follows is a lengthy discussion between 
Jason and Medea on the merits of Jason’s actions in which the two charac-
ters cannot reach any agreement (446-625)18. Once Jason exits the scene, 
the Chorus sings of the troubles endured by the couple (629-662) and then 
Aegeus – who at that time is supposed to be King of Athens – suddenly, and 
unexpectedly, enters de scene to meet Medea (663).
In the next passage (663-758), Aegeus tells Medea he is coming back 
from a consultation with the oracle of Delphos which he made because he is 
still childless at his age, a condition that has him very much worried. At first 
Medea merely expresses her wishes that he finds the solution to his troubles, 
but when he sees her distress and asks her what is wrong she not only tells 
him all about what Jason and Creon have done, but also promises to help him 
with his childlessness by making use of her knowledge about these matters if 
he gives her safe haven in Athens. By the end of their conversation, she has 
even managed to extract from him an oath that he will not only receive her at 
17  On the influence of Zeus over the events of Euripides’ Medea, see (Kovacs 1993).
18  Jason tries to convince Medea that her marriage to the princess is not only in his best interests 
but also on the best interests of Medea and their children. Medea, of course, is convinced. Indeed, 
although his social situation was certainly going to be improved by the marriage, once we take 
into account the laws of the Greek concerning former wives and their children the argument 
present by Jason according does seem to be misleading, to say the least. On this matter see (Leão 
2018, 183-184).
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Athens, but also that he will neither banish her from there nor give her up to 
anybody for as long as he lives (719-730, 749-751). Aegeus sole condition is 
that Medea must leave Corinth and come to Athens by herself, without any 
help from him. 
After making his vow, Aegeus leaves the scene. Right after his exit, we hear 
the Chorus Leader praise him for his generosity and express his wishes that 
Hermes, patron of travelers, sees that he returns safely to his house and is 
able to accomplish all that his heart desires (759-763). Having secured such 
an oath from Aegeus before any hard circumstances have forced her to resort 
to the sword, Medea can now go about determining the particulars of her 
plan for revenge. In the lines that immediately follow the praise of Aegeus by 
the Chorus Leader, she presents her plan to us as follows:
O Zeus and Zeus’s justice, O light of the sun, now, my friends, I shall be 
victorious over my enemies: I have set my foot on the path. Now I may con-
fidently expect that my enemies will pay the penalty. For this man, at the 
very point where I was most in trouble, has appeared as a harbor for my 
plans: to him will I tie my stern cable when I go to the city of Pallas Athena. 
Now I shall reveal to you my entire design. Hear, then, words that will give 
you no pleasure. I shall send one of my servants and ask Jason to come to 
see me. When he arrives, I shall speak soothing words to him, saying that I 
hold the same opinion as he, that the royal marriage he has made by aban-
doning me is well made, that these are beneficial and good decisions. I shall 
ask that the children be allowed to stay, not with the thought that I might 
leave my children behind on hostile soil for my enemies to insult, but so 
that I may kill the princess by guile. I shall send them bearing gifts, bearing 
them to the bride so as not to be exiled, a finely-woven gown and a diadem 
of beaten gold. If she takes this finery and puts it on, she will die a painful 
death, and likewise anyone who touches her: with such poisons will I smear 
these gifts19. (Medea, 764-789).
19  (764) ὦ Ζεῦ Δίκη τε Ζηνὸς Ἡλίου τε φῶς, (765) νῦν καλλίνικοι τῶν ἐμῶν ἐχθρῶν, φίλαι, 
γενησόμεσθα κεἰς ὁδὸν βεβήκαμεν, νῦν ἐλπὶς ἐχθροὺς τοὺς ἐμοὺς τείσειν δίκην. οὗτος γὰρ ἁνὴρ 
ᾗ μάλιστ᾽ ἐκάμνομεν λιμὴν πέφανται τῶν ἐμῶν βουλευμάτων: (770) ἐκ τοῦδ᾽ ἀναψόμεσθα 
πρυμνήτην κάλων, μολόντες ἄστυ καὶ πόλισμα Παλλάδος. ἤδη δὲ πάντα τἀμά σοι βουλεύματα 
λέξω: δέχου δὲ μὴ πρὸς ἡδονὴν λόγους. πέμψασ᾽ ἐμῶν τιν᾽ οἰκετῶν Ἰάσονα (775) ἐς ὄψιν ἐλθεῖν 
τὴν ἐμὴν αἰτήσομαι. μολόντι δ᾽ αὐτῷ μαλθακοὺς λέξω λόγους, ὡς καὶ δοκεῖ μοι ταὐτὰ καὶ 
καλῶς γαμεῖ γάμους τυράννων οὓς προδοὺς ἡμᾶς ἔχει, καὶ ξύμφορ᾽ εἶναι καὶ καλῶς ἐγνωσμένα. 
(780) παῖδας δὲ μεῖναι τοὺς ἐμοὺς αἰτήσομαι, οὐχ ὡς λιποῦσ᾽ ἂν πολεμίας ἐπὶ χθονὸς ἐχθροῖσι 
παῖδας τοὺς ἐμοὺς καθυβρίσαι, ἀλλ᾽ ὡς δόλοισι παῖδα βασιλέως κτάνω. πέμψω γὰρ αὐτοὺς δῶρ᾽ 
ἔχοντας ἐν χεροῖν, (785) (νύμφῃ φέροντας, τήνδε μὴ φυγεῖν χθόνα), λεπτόν τε πέπλον καὶ πλόκον 
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As we can see, all the stages of her plan for revenge have now been clearly 
settled by Medea. First, she’ll ask Jason to come to see her and make peace 
with him by pretending to have changed her own mind about his decision. 
Then, she’ll ask him if the children can stay. As it becomes clear in their con-
versation, although Jason would very much like if the children could stay 
both he and Medea know that this decision is up to Creon, and that he’ll 
probably be heavily influenced by her daughter when making it. This is why 
Medea will tell Jason that it is a good idea to send them bearing such explen-
did gifts to the princess in order to soothe her. Once Jason agrees, all that is 
left for her to do is to give the items to the children and command them to 
go deliver it to the princess. If all goes as planned, she will put them on, die 
a painful death and take with her whoever touches her.
So far one could say that Medea has stuck with the general lines of her 
plan. The only change, it seems, is the fact that when she first presented it 
to us she made it clear that she wanted to murder Creon, his daughter and 
Jason, but now she is telling us that the plan is only guaranteed to murder the 
princess. Be that as it may, it seems safe to suppose that Medea is hoping that 
Creon and Jason will try to save her once they see the pain she is enduring, 
touching her in the process and, consequently, dying of the poison too. 
But Medea’s plan does not end here. Indeed, she knows there is one more 
deed she needs to perform before she can leave Corinth and, as she very well 
knows, it is this final act which will be the hardest for her to accomplish. This 
is how Medea herself speaks about this final deed after she has told us how 
she intends to kill the princess. 
This subject, however, I now leave behind. Ah me, I groan at what a deed I 
must do next! I shall kill my children: there is no one who can rescue them. 
When I have utterly confounded the whole house of Jason, I shall leave the 
land, in flight from the murder of my own dear sons, having committed a 
most unholy deed20. (Medea 790-796).
χρυσήλατον: κἄνπερ λαβοῦσα κόσμον ἀμφιθῇ χροΐ, κακῶς ὀλεῖται πᾶς θ᾽ ὃς ἂν θίγῃ κόρης: 
τοιοῖσδε χρίσω φαρμάκοις δωρήματα. 
20  (790) ἐνταῦθα μέντοι τόνδ᾽ ἀπαλλάσσω λόγον. ᾤμωξα δ᾽ οἷον ἔργον ἔστ᾽ ἐργαστέον 
τοὐντεῦθεν ἡμῖν: τέκνα γὰρ κατακτενῶ τἄμ᾽: οὔτις ἔστιν ὅστις ἐξαιρήσεται: δόμον τε πάντα 
συγχέασ᾽ Ἰάσονος (795) ἔξειμι γαίας, φιλτάτων παίδων φόνον φεύγουσα καὶ τλᾶσ᾽ ἔργον 
ἀνοσιώτατον.
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Although this act was not mentioned by Medea when she first outlined 
her plans to us, it is worth mentioning that before she first outlined her plans 
she did express her desire that they perish with their father and that his 
whole house collapses in ruin (111-114). Therefore, we can say that Medea’s 
wish for the death of her children with Jason was made known to us even 
before she first outlined her plans. Nevertheless, at that moment she said 
neither that she intended to make their death a necessary part of her plan nor 
that she intended to kill them herself. Couldn’t she have found some other 
way? Why must the children die too?
When faced with the Chorus Leader’s doubt about whether she will be 
able to bring herself to kill her own children (816), Medea answers only that 
it is the way to hurt Jason the most (817). And when the Chorus Leader an-
swers that by committing such an act she will become the most wretched of 
women (818) she says only that, although that might be so, until the moment 
comes for her to carry out her action all talk is superfluous, and then she im-
mediately asks the nurse to go fetch Jason for her (819 et seq.). 
The reason presented by Medea on these lines connects rather well with 
the motivation she presents to us both when she first outlines he general plan 
for revenge and after she has already met Aegeus and has settled on a specific 
course of action, namely, to win glory and avoid the mockery of her enemies. 
On these occasions, Medea explains what motivates her to draw such plans 
with the following words,  
(395) By the goddess I worship most of all, my chosen helper Hecate, who 
dwells in the inner chamber of my house, none of them shall pain my heart 
and smile at it! Bitter and grievous will I make their union and bitter Cre-
on’s marriage alliance and his banishment of me from the land! Come, Me-
dea, spare nothing of the arts you are mistress of as you plot and contrive! 
Into the fray! Now it is a contest of courage. Do you see what is being done 
to you? You must not suffer mockery from this Sisyphean marriage of Jason, 
you who are sprung from a noble father and have Helios for your grandsire. 
You understand how to proceed. And furthermore we are women, unable to 
perform noble, but most skilful architects of every evil21. (Medea, 395-409).
21  (395) οὐ γὰρ μὰ τὴν δέσποιναν ἣν ἐγὼ σέβω μάλιστα πάντων καὶ ξυνεργὸν εἱλόμην, Ἑκάτην, 
μυχοῖς ναίουσαν ἑστίας ἐμῆς, χαίρων τις αὐτῶν τοὐμὸν ἀλγυνεῖ κέαρ. πικροὺς δ᾽ ἐγώ σφιν καὶ 
λυγροὺς θήσω γάμους, (400) πικρὸν δὲ κῆδος καὶ φυγὰς ἐμὰς χθονός. ἀλλ᾽ εἶα φείδου μηδὲν ὧν 
ἐπίστασαι, Μήδεια, βουλεύουσα καὶ τεχνωμένη: ἕρπ᾽ ἐς τὸ δεινόν: νῦν ἀγὼν εὐψυχίας. ὁρᾷς ἃ 
πάσχεις; οὐ γέλωτα δεῖ σ᾽ ὀφλεῖν (405) τοῖς Σισυφείοις τοῖσδ᾽ Ἰάσονος γάμοις, γεγῶσαν ἐσθλοῦ 
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(797) The laughter of one’s enemies is unendurable, my friends. Let that be 
as it will. What do I gain by living? I have no fatherland, no house and no 
means to turn aside misfortune. My mistake was when I left my father’s 
house, persuaded by the words of a Greek. This man—a god being my 
helper—will pay the price of his deeds to me. He shall never from this day 
see his children by me alive, nor will he have children by his new bride since 
that wretch must die a wretched death by my poisons. Let no one think me 
weak, contemptible, untroublesome. No, quite the opposite, hurtful to foes, 
to friends. Such persons live a life of greatest glory22. (Medea, 797-810).
In these two paragraphs, Medea portrays her motivation to take revenge 
as a way to avoid being the subject of mockery to her enemies – i.e. of being 
laughed at by them. She believes that she can achieve this goal if she turns 
Jason’s marriage and her banishment, which are supposed to be victories for 
them and, therefore, something sweet, into something bitter, and that she 
can operate this transformation if she shows herself not to be weak and con-
temptible, but hurtful. In other words, by inflicting pain on them for what 
they have done to her. If we take this into account, we can them explain the 
murder of her children with Jason as a way to inflict the maximum amount 
of pain she can inflict on Jason – which is the main responsible for her cur-
rent predicament.
Nevertheless, one could argue that the desire to avoid mockery and to 
hurt her enemies is not enough to justify the murder of the children23. In-
deed, even if the Princess and Jason clearly count as Medea’s enemies, it is 
not clear that the children also should count as her enemies. Couldn’t Medea 
have spared them? Wasn’t the murder of the princess enough punishment for 
Jason? Wasn’t that pain enough to make sure she would not be the subject of 
mockery by her enemies? Why did Medea felt that it was needed to sacrifice 
the children in order to fulfill her plan? 
πατρὸς Ἡλίου τ᾽ ἄπο. ἐπίστασαι δέ: πρὸς δὲ καὶ πεφύκαμεν γυναῖκες, ἐς μὲν ἔσθλ᾽ἀμηχανώταται, 
κακῶν δὲ πάντων τέκτονες σοφώταται.
22  (797) οὐ γὰρ γελᾶσθαι τλητὸν ἐξ ἐχθρῶν, φίλαι. ἴτω: τί μοι ζῆν κέρδος; οὔτε μοι πατρὶς οὔτ᾽ 
οἶκος ἔστιν οὔτ᾽ ἀποστροφὴ κακῶν. (800) ἡμάρτανον τόθ᾽ ἡνίκ᾽ ἐξελίμπανον δόμους πατρῴους, 
ἀνδρὸς Ἕλληνος λόγοις πεισθεῖσ᾽, ὃς ἡμῖν σὺν θεῷ τείσει δίκην. οὔτ᾽ ἐξ ἐμοῦ γὰρ παῖδας ὄψεταί 
ποτε ζῶντας τὸ λοιπὸν οὔτε τῆς νεοζύγου (805) νύμφης τεκνώσει παῖδ᾽, ἐπεὶ κακὴν κακῶς θανεῖν 
σφ᾽ ἀνάγκη τοῖς ἐμοῖσι φαρμάκοις. μηδείς με φαύλην κἀσθενῆ νομιζέτω μηδ᾽ ἡσυχαίαν, ἀλλὰ 
θατέρου τρόπου, βαρεῖαν ἐχθροῖς καὶ φίλοισιν εὐμενῆ: (810) τῶν γὰρ τοιούτων εὐκλεέστατος βίος.
23  I have argued this myself in (Nascimento 2015, 271-272). 
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In order to answer this question we must remember that, according to 
Medea and the whole Greek mythical tradition, when Jason accepted to 
marry the princess he was breaking the oath of marriage he has made to 
Medea, that his oath is guarded by the gods (20-23, 161, 439, 492, 1392), 
that divine justice demands that he should be punished accordingly (26, 
160, 165, 578, 580, 582, 592, 1352 53) and that, as has been remarked 
by (Kovacs 1993, 59-60), the most common form of punishment invoked 
by the Greeks against such an offence was the total destruction of the per-
jurer’s family24. Since the children surely count as Jason’s family, we can 
conclude that by killing them Medea was bringing about an integral part 
of the punishment that should be inflicted upon Jason according to the 
divine laws of the Greek gods. In fact, it seems even plausible to say that it 
was to this penalty that she was alluding in the beginning of the play when 
she expressed her desire that they perish with their father and that his 
whole house collapses in ruin (111-114). If we do so, we can then explain 
Medea’s desire for the death of her children as a desire for Jason to suffer 
the just penalty for his actions.
Having explained how Medea came to settle on her particular plans for 
revenge, it is now time to show why I believe that we can use Bratman’s 
theory about the reasonable stability of our plans to argue that there is a 
kind of irrationality in Medea’s behavior when she executes her plan. If 
what is said bellow is correct, the problem Medea faces when trying to 
put her plan into action is the problem of temptation, and we can say that 
she displays a sort of irrationality because she irrationally abandons her 
plans in the last step – i.e. when the time comes for her to kill the children. 
Although we shall also see that this abandonment does not last long, for 
Medea immediately reconsiders the abandonment of her previous plan and 
decides to fulfill it, this does not change the fact that she does abandon it.
As I’ve said before, according to Bratman the stability of an agent’s plan 
can be threatened by temptation even when the agent knows beforehand 
that he may be tempted to abandon his plan and that he should not give 
in to temptation. But this does not seem to be the case of Medea. Indeed, 
through the whole of Euripides’ play Medea herself never explicitly says 
that she is anticipating anything like what Bratman describes as temptation 
24  For the earlier mentions of this punishment in Homer, Hesiod and others see (Gagné 2010, 
2013). See also Andocides 1.98 and Herodotus 6. 86 for latter mentions of it. 
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– i.e. a change of judgment as to what is best to do25. Only the Chorus 
clearly expresses such doubts about Medea’s strength to fulfill her plans 
(856-865)26. 
Nevertheless, Medea does show that she is aware of how painful will be 
the task she has set for herself not only when she unveils to us the final steps 
of her plans – at which point she says, as we’ve quoted, that she “groans” 
(οἰμώζω) at the deed (791) – but also in several other moments of the play. 
Can any of these passages be used to argue that Medea was tempted not to 
kill her children? In order to answer this question we have to take a close 
look at each of them.  
The first of these passages comes right in the next scene (894-905), where 
she pretends to reconcile herself with Jason. In this scene, there is a passage 
where she calls the children to come greet their father and, as they’re doing so, 
Medea suddenly starts crying in the middle of her lines. According to the ex-
planation that is offered by her in these lines, she does so because she is full of 
foreboding, thinking of something the future keeps hid (900-902). The most 
natural way of interpreting this passage is to say that it is the thought of killing 
the children in the future that is bringing tears to Medea at this moment and, 
as far as I can tell, this has been the standard interpretation of this passage.
The second passage comes a few lines after, after she and Jason are already 
“reconciled” (908-931). Right after Jason commends Medea for her change 
of heart, saying that she is now acting like a prudent woman, he says to the 
children that he has secured abundant prosperity for them, and that all they 
have to do in order to hold the very first place in the land of Corinth – along 
with their future brothers who the Princess will presumably give birth to – is 
grow to manhood. When Jason prays that they do so, Medea immediately 
starts weeping again. When Jason asks her the reason for her tears, she says 
that she was thinking about the children (925) and that, when he prayed they 
might live, she felt pity for them wondering whether this would be (925-931).
25  This is not a problem for the interpretation defended here. All that Bratman says is that an 
agent may foresee that he’ll feel temptation and still feel tempted when the time comes. Nowhere 
does he say that for temptation to exist the agent must have foreseen it.
26  “(856) How will you summon up the strength of purpose or the courage of hand and heart to 
dare this dreadful deed? (860) When you have turned your eyes upon your children, how will you 
behold their fate with tearless eye? When your children fall as suppliants at your feet, you will not 
be able to drench your hand in their blood (865) with hardened heart”. (Medea, 856-865). (856) 
πόθεν θράσος ἢ φρενὸς ἢ χειρὶ τέκνων σέθεν καρδίᾳ τε λήψῃ δεινὰν προσάγουσα τόλ- (860) μαν; 
πῶς δ᾽ ὄμματα προσβαλοῦσα τέκνοις ἄδακρυν μοῖραν σχήσεις φόνου; οὐ δυνάσῃ, παίδων ἱκετᾶν 
πιτνόντων, τέγξαι χέρα φοινίαν (865) τλάμονι θυμῷ).
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The third passage comes after the Tutor of the children has returned with 
them from the house of Princess (1002-1020). Once he tells Medea that the 
presents offered by the children were accepted by the Princess and that she 
has agreed not to exile them, she once again starts weeping. The Tutor, who is 
oblivious to Medea’s plans, is very much surprised by her reaction, and when 
he asks her why she is crying she says merely that she has every reason to feel 
the way she does. “The gods, and I, thinking wickedly (κακῶς φρονοῦσ᾽)”, 
says Medea, “have contrived it so” (1014)27. 
Now, it is worth noticing that although in the above mentioned passage 
I decided to translated κακῶς as wickedly, choosing to highlight its moral 
meaning, the term could also be translated as ‘poorly’ so as to give the idea 
that what Medea is saying is that she was not thinking well when she decided 
to murder her children28. But even if we do change the translation in this way 
it is hard to see how one could argue that Medea was feeling tempted not to 
kill her children in this passage.
Indeed, even if we accept that at this point Medea had changed her mind 
about the wisdom of her decision, we must recognize that neither this pas-
sage nor the passages mentioned before where Medea weeps at the thought of 
killing her children suggest that Medea is considering not going through with 
the murder. Indeed, at the third passage she even speaks as if at that point 
it was too late for her to do anything else but kill her own children. There-
fore, none of these passages can be counted on as evidence that Medea was 
tempted not to kill her own children at that point.
The fourth passage comes right after the third (1021-1039). In this pas-
sage Medea addresses her own children and once again laments the desti-
ny that awaits both herself and them. More specifically, she says that her 
αὐθάδεια (willfulness or stubbornness) has made her δυστάλαινα (most mis-
erable) (1028) because she will have to go to another land before she can 
see them married and happy (1024-1027), and they will neither tend to her 
when she becomes old nor dress her for burial with their own hands when 
she passes (1032-1039). This, says Medea, means that all her troubles to give 
them birth and to bring them up were in vain (1029-1031). 
27  ταῦτα γὰρ θεοὶ κἀγὼ κακῶς φρονοῦσ᾽ ἐμηχανησάμην.
28  I believe this is the sense of the translation we find in (Euripides 1994, 377), even though 
Kovacs prefers to translate κακῶς φρονοῦσ᾽ for ‘in my madness’. After all, since the Greek word 
for madness (μανία) does not appear anywhere in this passage, it seems the only plausible way 
to explain Kovacs choice is by saying that he is using the word ‘madness’ here in a figurative way.
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As it is the case with the third passage, although one could claim that 
when Medea says that her αὐθάδεια has made her δυστάλαινα she is criticiz-
ing her own decision, we also find no suggestion in this passage that Medea 
is considering not going through with it. Once again, she speaks as if at that 
point it was too late for her to do anything else but kill her own children and, 
therefore, this passage also cannot be counted on as evidence that Medea was 
tempted not to kill her own children at that point.
Having dealt with these four passages, we can now move on to the fifth and 
final passage I wish to analyze here. The passage I’m referring to has been cited as 
one of the most famous and commented passages in all Greek tragedies. It comes 
right after the fourth passage I have quoted, and goes all the way from line 1040 
to 1080. As we shall see, in this 40-line passage Medea gives a long speech in 
which she changes her mind numerous times before finally going along with her 
plan. For the sake of exposition, it will be convenient to divide this passage in 
several pieces – each of which corresponds to one such a change of mind. 
Bearing in mind this division, we can start with the following lines
Oh! What is the meaning of your glance at me, children? Why do you smile 
at me this last smile of yours? Alas, what am I to do? My courage is gone, 
women, ever since I saw the bright faces of the children. I cannot do it. 
Farewell, my former designs! I shall take my children out of the land. Why 
should I wound their father with their pain and win for myself pain twice as 
great? I shall not: farewell, my designs!29 (Medea, 1040-1048).
As we can see, in this passage Medea explicitly abandon her plan to kill 
the children. The way she does it must be emphasized. At first, she tells us 
that her courage – or, more literally, her heart (καρδία) – was gone when she 
saw the face of her children and announces the abandonment of her plan. It 
is only then that a rational justification for such an abandonment is offered: 
Medea reasons that she should not kill their children because that would 
generate twice more pain in her than in Jason. 
Even though this might seem like a powerful argument, Medea will im-
mediately ascribe her acceptance of it to mere weakness and change her mind 
once again. The next lines of her speech can be read as follows,
29  (1040) φεῦ φεῦ: τί προσδέρκεσθέ μ᾽ ὄμμασιν, τέκνα; τί προσγελᾶτε τὸν πανύστατον γέλων; 
αἰαῖ: τί δράσω; καρδία γὰρ οἴχεται, γυναῖκες, ὄμμα φαιδρὸν ὡς εἶδον τέκνων. οὐκ ἂν δυναίμην: 
χαιρέτω βουλεύματα (1045) τὰ πρόσθεν: ἄξω παῖδας ἐκ γαίας ἐμούς. τί δεῖ με πατέρα τῶνδε τοῖς 
τούτων κακοῖς λυποῦσαν αὐτὴν δὶς τόσα κτᾶσθαι κακά; οὐ δῆτ᾽ ἔγωγε: χαιρέτω βουλεύματα.
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But what is coming over me? Do I wish to suffer mockery, letting my 
enemies go unpunished? Must I put up with that? No, it is mere weak-
ness in me even to admit such tender words into my heart. Children, go 
into the house. Whoever is not permitted to attend my sacrifice must 
take care himself not to be there. I shall not weaken my hand.30 (Medea, 
1049-1055).
Once again, Medea reaffirms her desire not to suffer mockery, and this 
time she explicitly says that she would suffer it if she lets her enemies go 
unpunished – suggesting, therefore, that the murder of the children are in-
deed a way to punish them, and that this punishment is a condition for 
her not to be subject to mockery. Although there is no explicit reference to 
regret here, it does seem that the most intuitive way to understand Medea’s 
reasoning is to say that she is considering if it is worth it to spare the chil-
dren now and endure her enemies’ mockery latter, and that she concludes 
that it is not worth it – i.e. that if she spares the children now and suffers 
mockery latter she will end up regretting it. If we do so, we can then say that 
it is the thought of posterior regret that makes Medea retake her previously 
abandoned plan.
Although by line 1055 Medea has already adopted the stance with which 
her monologue will end, the text of Euripides’ play that has gotten to us 
contains two more episodes of reconsideration that go from line 1056 to 
line 1064 before the conclusion, which goes from line 1065 to line 1080. As 
we know, these 25 last lines of Medea’s monologue have been the topic of 
considerable controversy among scholars31. Some – like (Bergk 1884, 512 
n. 14), (Müller 1951), (Reeve 1972) and (Zwierlein 1978) – have proposed 
that should be entirely excised. Others – like (Kovacs 1986, 348-349) – have 
proposed that only lines 1056-1064 should be excised. A third group, among 
which we can place (Seidensticker 1990) and (La Combe 2006), have argued 
that all lines must be kept. 
Since we can’t possibly hope to settle this dispute here, I believe the most 
prudent way to proceed is to discuss this last lines as if they belonged to the 
30  καίτοι τί πάσχω; βούλομαι γέλωτ᾽ ὀφλεῖν (1050) ἐχθροὺς μεθεῖσα τοὺς ἐμοὺς ἀζημίους; 
τολμητέον τάδ᾽; ἀλλὰ τῆς ἐμῆς κάκης τὸ καὶ προσέσθαι μαλθακοὺς λόγους φρενί. χωρεῖτε, παῖδες, 
ἐς δόμους. ὅτῳ δὲ μὴ θέμις παρεῖναι τοῖς ἐμοῖσι θύμασιν, (1055) αὐτῷ μελήσει: χεῖρα δ᾽ οὐ 
διαφθερῶ.
31  The bibliography on this subject is too vast to be quoted here. For the main references to the 
contemporary debate see (Seidensticker 1990, 99 n. 1). 
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monologue. Nevertheless, it is worth noticing that, if what is said below is 
correct, the thesis I’m arguing for is neutral on this controversy. Indeed, if we 
accept the argument that follows, we should conclude both that, even if we 
do decide to excise them, lines 1040-1055 already give us enough to argue 
that Medea has irrationally succumbed to temptation before she retakes and 
executes her plan, and that the passage that goes from 1056-1080 gives us 
no evidence that Medea abandons her plan once more. Since we don’t need 
them to argue that Medea is guilty of the kind of irrationality we are trying 
to ascribe to her and they do not offer us the possibility of ascribing them 
another irrational episode, our argument is indeed indifferent to whether or 
not we accept these lines as part of the play.  
That being said, we can move on to lines 1056-1058. They can be read 
as follows,
Oh! Do not, my angry heart, do not do these things. Let them go, hard-
hearted wretch, spare the children! If they live with me in that other place, 
they will gladden you.32 (Medea, 1056-1058). 
As has been argued by many – f. ex. (Kovacs 1986, 347) – the expression 
‘that other place’ here must be a reference to Athens, where Medea herself 
plans to escape, instead of to the afterlife – as it is most naturally taken when 
it appears elsewhere on the monologue. According to this interpretation, 
then, what she is proposing here is to escape with the children with her to 
Athens because if she does so she will be gladdened to live there with them. 
This, of course, is clearly a consideration against the murder of the children. 
But it is unclear whether or not Medea once again abandons her plans in light 
of this consideration. Indeed, nowhere in these two lines we see the kind of 
clear rebut of her plans we found between lines 1044 and 1048. Therefore, 
they offer us no safe ground from which to argue that Medea abandoned her 
plans at this precise moment.
Having made this point, we can move on to the next passage. It can be 
read as follows,
By Hell’s avenging furies, I shall never leave my children for my enemies to 
outrage! They must die in any case. And since they must, the one who gave 
32  (1056) ἆ ἆ. μὴ δῆτα, θυμέ, μὴ σύ γ᾽ ἐργάσῃ τάδε: ἔασον αὐτούς, ὦ τάλαν, φεῖσαι τέκνων: ἐκεῖ 
μεθ᾽ ἡμῶν ζῶντες εὐφρανοῦσί σε.
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them birth shall kill them. These things are settled in any case and cannot 
be undone.33 (Medea, 1059-1064).
As we can see, in this passage Medea rejects the consideration she had 
entertained in 1056-1058 and reaffirms the need to kill her children. Given 
what we have said so far about Medea’s motivation, the most intuitive way 
of reconstructing her reasoning here is to say Medea has reminded herself 
that the children must die in order for Jason to get the punishment that is 
assigned to those who break their oaths. Now, in order for that to happen 
Medea cannot escape with the children nor let anyone else save them: she 
must either kill them herself and spare them any outrage, or leave them to 
be killed and outraged by her enemies for the murder of the princess. Faced 
with these two options, she chooses to kill them herself instead of leaving 
them to be killed and outraged by her enemies.
Having finally settled decisively on a course of action, Medea concludes 
her monologue in the following manner,
Already the crown is on her head and the royal bride is perishing in the robe, 
I know it well. But – since I now go down the road of greatest misery and 
send these down one unhappier yet – I want to say farewell to the children. 
Give me your right hands to kiss, my children, give them to me! O hands 
and lips so dear to me, O noble face and bearing of my children! I wish you 
happiness – but in that other place. What is here your father has taken 
away. Oh, how sweet is the touch, how tender the skin, how fragrant the 
breath of these children! Go in, go in. I can no longer look at you but am 
overwhelmed with my pain. And I know well what pain I am about to un-
dergo, but my θυμὸς is the master of my plans, (1080) θυμὸς that brings 
mortal men their gravest hurt.34 (Medea, 1065-1080).
33  μὰ τοὺς παρ᾽ Ἅιδῃ νερτέρους ἀλάστορας, (1060) οὔτοι ποτ᾽ ἔσται τοῦθ᾽ ὅπως ἐχθροῖς 
ἐγὼ παῖδας παρήσω τοὺς ἐμοὺς καθυβρίσαι. πάντως σφ᾽ ἀνάγκη κατθανεῖν: ἐπεὶ δὲ χρή, ἡμεῖς 
κτενοῦμεν οἵπερ ἐξεφύσαμεν. πάντως πέπρακται ταῦτα κοὐκ ἐκφεύξεται).
34  (1065) καὶ δὴ ‹πὶ κρατὶ στέφανος, ἐν πέπλοισι δὲ νύμφη τύραννος ὄλλυται, σάφ᾽ οἶδ᾽ ἐγώ. 
ἀλλ᾽, εἶμι γὰρ δὴ τλημονεστάτην ὁδὸν καὶ τούσδε πέμψω τλημονεστέραν ἔτι, παῖδας προσειπεῖν 
βούλομαι: δότ᾽, ὦ τέκνα, (1070) δότ᾽ ἀσπάσασθαι μητρὶ δεξιὰν χέρα. ὦ φιλτάτη χείρ, φίλτατον 
δέ μοι στόμα καὶ σχῆμα καὶ πρόσωπον εὐγενὲς τέκνων, εὐδαιμονοῖτον, ἀλλ᾽ ἐκεῖ: τὰ δ᾽ ἐνθάδε 
πατὴρ ἀφείλετ᾽. ὦ γλυκεῖα προσβολή, (1075) ὦ μαλθακὸς χρὼς πνεῦμά θ᾽ ἥδιστον τέκνων. 
χωρεῖτε χωρεῖτ᾽: οὐκέτ᾽ εἰμὶ προσβλέπειν οἵα τε †πρὸς ὑμᾶς† ἀλλὰ νικῶμαι κακοῖς. καὶ μανθάνω 
μὲν οἷα τολμήσω κακά, θυμὸς δὲ κρείσσων τῶν ἐμῶν βουλευμάτων, (1080) ὅσπερ μεγίστων 
αἴτιος κακῶν βροτοῖς. Here I have changed the translation we find in (Euripides 1994, 383). Ko-
vacs has chosen to translate θυμὸς δὲ κρείσσων τῶν ἐμῶν βουλευμάτων as “my wrath overbears 
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Once again, even though Medea proclaims the children to have a sweet 
touch and a fragrant breath, nowhere do we find any suggestion that she is 
even considering, let alone being tempted, to abandon her plan once more. 
Having gone through all the parts of Medeas’ monologue, we can then con-
clude that the only passage that could allow us to say that Medea has suc-
cumbed to temptation, even though in the end she went through with her 
plan, is the one that extends from 1040-1055. Therefore, it is based on that 
passage that the thesis proposed here must be defended. 
That being said, if we examine this passage by itself it seems that all it al-
low us to say for certain is that Medea indeed came to abandon her plans to 
kill the children. But what I’m trying to argue is not only that she abandoned 
her plans, but also that she abandoned because she was under  temptation as 
understood in Bratman’s theory. Therefore, even though we have ascertained 
that Medea has indeed abandoned her plans, we still need to ask if it is indeed 
reasonable to ascribe Medea’s abandonment of her plans to temptation as 
understood in Bratman’s theory.
As we’ve seen in section II, according to Bratman temptation is a phe-
nomenon that occurs due to an individual being under bowed discount func-
tions when measuring the value of two alternative courses of action. This 
phenomenon can lead to the reconsideration of one’s plans, and the rational 
way for an agent to deal with it is for him to take into account whether or 
not he’ll end up regretting having abandoned his plan. According to Brat-
man, an agent will have dealt rationally with temptation either if he does not 
reconsider his plans in face of temptation, when and if the temptation is not 
enough to warrant reconsideration, or if he does reconsider it but sticks to 
his plan because he understands that if he doesn’t he’ll end up regretting it.
Can we say that Medea’s evaluation of the two goals between which she 
must choose – killing her children in order to avoid the mockery of her en-
emies and spare the children’s lives in order to avoid the pain of murdering 
them – is subject to bowed discount functions? Although any answer to this 
question must rely on some speculation, I do believe we have good reason to 
say she is. Indeed, even though in several moments of the play Medea shows 
herself to be aware of the pain that the murder is going to cause her, she starts 
to speak as if she had made a mistake when she decided to kill the children 
my calculations”, a translation that is very similar to the one we find in (Irwin 1983, 191). Since 
I’ve already defended the translation proposed by me in (Nascimento 2015, 269-272), there is no 
need to repeat my arguments here. 
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only as the time for the murder is approaching, and it is only when she is 
about to perform the act that she suddenly starts thinking that it is better not 
to go through with it and abandons her plan. 
Besides, after the murder is done she never shows an ounce of regret or 
suffering over having done it. Once Medea is through with her speech, the 
chorus leader laments the labors and pains that mortals who have children 
must endure (1081-1115) and then Medea herself spots the arrival of a mes-
senger who is bringing news from the castle (1116-1120). Once the mes-
senger relates how the princess and her father have died from the poison 
contained in the gifs sent by Medea (1120-1230), the chorus both states that 
calamity was brought upon Jason with justice and laments the fate of the 
princess (1235) and Medea announces again her resolve to kill the children 
(1236-1259). Although that announcement is followed with remarks by the 
chorus about the consequences of spilling kindred blood (1251-1270), the 
next thing we read is a cry for help from one of the children (1271). The 
murder of both of them happens quickly (1271-1279), and all that is left for 
the chorus to do is to lament that Medea pushed herself to such an extreme 
(1280-1291).
In the last scene (1294-1419), Jason arrives with the double intent of 
bringing Medea to justice and saving the children from the vengeance of the 
other members of the royal house, but as soon as he announces his intents 
the chorus leader tells him that Medea has killed their children. All he’ll man-
age to do is confront Medea about her actions before she leaves the scene in 
the carriage that was given to her by Helios – her grandfather. In this last con-
frontation Jason shows himself to be astonished with the fact that Medea was 
capable of killing the children (1323-1329), remarks that no Greek woman 
would dare to do that (1339-1340) and highlights that she, Medea, is a sharer 
in his misfortune (1361). Her answer is short and very much to the point of 
our discussion: “Of course”, says Medea, “but the pain is worthwhile if you 
cannot mock me” (1362). 
In the closing lines of the play she denies repeated requests made by Jason 
to bury the children and announces that she’ll bury them herself in Athens, 
at the sanctuary of Hera Akraia. Jason calls repeatedly for the divine powers 
– the Furies, Justice (1389) and even Zeus (1405-1407) – to punish Medea 
for her deeds, but she will successfully exit the scene on her grandfather’s 
carriage and the bodies of her two children.
 Given all this, I believe we can say that if we look at the behavior of Medea 
during the play we have good reason to ascertain that that Medea’s evaluation 
267Faces of irrationality in Euripides: on Medea’s irrationality
O que nos faz pensar, Rio de Janeiro, v.27, n.43, p. 237-272, jul.-dez. 2018
of the two goals between which she must choose in the last step of her plan 
is indeed subject to bowed discount functions along the play. Nowhere does 
she put so much value on her children’s lives as she does when the moment 
comes to kill them, and once she has summoned to mind the regret she’ll 
feel if she lets them live she never changes her mind again even though, if 
we accept the authenticity of some of the disputed lines, we are forced to say 
that she did entertain one more consideration for a contrary course of action. 
Once we accept that Medea’s evaluation of the two goals between which 
she must choose is subject to bowed discount functions, we can say that Me-
dea indeed behaved irrationally according to Bratman’s theory of plan stabil-
ity when she abandoned her plans. For Medea abandoned her plan without 
anticipating and taking into account her future regret while reconsidering it 
(1040-1055). Therefore, it does seem we have enough to say, according to 
Bratman’s theory, that Medea’s abandonment of her plan was indeed irrational.
IV. Conclusion
As I’ve stated in the introduction, the purpose of this article was to argue that 
Medea instantiated a kind of irrational behavior that was different from the 
kind of irrationality that was attributed to her in (Irwin 1983). In order to 
do so, I proposed to clarify what sort of irrationality I believe to be instanti-
ated by Medea’s behavior using Michael Bratman’s theory of plan stability 
(second II), and then to analyze Euripides’ text in order to show why I think 
we should say that Medea does display that sort of irrationality (section III).
In section II, I’ve given a broad outline of Michael Bratman’s theory of 
plan stability in order to present his theory about how a rational individual 
should deal with what he calls temptation. As I’ve shown in that section, 
according to Bratman temptation is a phenomenon that occurs when the fol-
lowing conditions are met. At t
1
 the individual faces a choice between doing 
A or doing B at t
2
; the individual’s evaluation of A and B is subject to bowed 
temporal discount functions so that (a) at t
1
 he prefers to do A than to do 
B and, therefore, he chooses and plans to do A at t
2
. But, precisely because 
the individual’s evaluation of A and B is subject to bowed temporal discount 
functions, (b) the individual will come to temporally, but not definitively, pre-
fer B to A before t
2
, and so he will be tempted to do B instead of doing A either 
before or at t
2
; so that (c) if he actually does B instead of A he will come to 
regret it latter, once his preferences are back the way they were at t
1
. 
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According to Bratman, an agent can deal with temptation rationally in 
either of two ways. If the case is such that what is to be gained by abandon-
ing his plans cannot possibly outweigh the cost of reconsidering his previous 
plan, then an agent will act rationally if he does not reconsider his plans. But 
in cases where reconsideration implies in no such costs an agent may recon-
sider his plan and still act rationally if he anticipates his future regret, takes 
it into consideration when reconsidering his plans, and decides to follow 
through with his plan.
In section III, I’ve argued that Medea was tempted not to kill her children 
when the moment came because she discounted the good she was aiming at 
in her plan, namely, to avoid the mockery of her enemies. As I hope to have 
shown, we can say that Medea’s evaluation of the two goals between which 
she must choose – killing her children in order to avoid the mockery of her 
enemies and spare the children’s lives in order to avoid the pain of murder-
ing them – is subject to bowed discount functions. For it is only right before 
the time to kill her children arrives that she prefers not to kill them. Indeed, 
Medea is calling for their death since the beginning of the play, she announces 
her intention to kill them right after she meets Aegeus, and never does she 
express any regret for having killed them after she has done it.
Besides, I also argued that if we accept Bratman’s theory of plan stability 
we can say that Medea behaved irrationally when she abandoned her plans in 
face of temptation. Indeed, at that moment Medea gives no thought to the re-
gret she’ll feel for letting the kids live and becoming a subject of mockery for 
her enemies. It is only after she has abandoned her plan that such thoughts 
enter her mind and, as soon as they do, she retakes her plan and follows 
through with it. 
Although it could be said that this interpretation ascribes to Medea an ir-
rational act of very little importance, since in the end she did follow through 
with her plan, we must bear in mind that when looking for depictions of 
irrational behavior in the works of Euripides we should not necessarily look 
for irrational acts of great consequence. What should interest us is not the 
magnitude of the act, but the mere fact that Euripides took the time to depict 
such acts as thoroughly and accurately as he did. Given that philosophers did 
not begin to study such cases of irrationality before the 20th century, this is 
certainly remarkable in itself.
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